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Daniel Heller-Roazen, Fortune's Faces: The Roman de la 
Rose and the Poetics of Contingency. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003.xiii + 206 pp. ISBN 0801871913. 
Reviewed by Grace Armstrong 
Bryn Mawr College 
Fortune's Faces, published in Hopkins's Parallax Series -- Revisions of 
Culture and Society -- is an impressive contribution to the vigorously 
growing critical literature on the thirteenth-century Old French Roman de la 
rose by Guillaume de Lorris and his continuator Jean de Meun. Heller-
Roazen marshalls expertise in three disciplines -- classical and medieval 
philosophy, philology (Old French, Latin, and Greek), and close reading -- to 
build a persuasive -- and ingenious -- demonstration that the romance "shows 
itself and its own production to be not necessary but, instead, possible and 
merely fortuitous -- in a word, contingent" (7). The result is a tightly argued, 
dense but almost always limpid study that redresses many earlier critical 
misapprehensions of the so-called digressive, meandering or even incoherent 
nature of Jean de Meun's "second" Rose. Heller-Roazen further shows that 
this bipartite romance or "double fragment" (7), whose unity has so often 
been placed in doubt by the contrast between Guillaume's tightly articulated 
fragment and Jean's loose and wide-ranging continuation, is, in fact, unified 
by "the contingency of its form and structure" (8). By this, Heller-Roazen 
means that at each level of its construction, "in its characteristic interruptions 
and digressions, the romance appears as a work that incessantly explores its 
own capacity to be otherwise than it is; in the staging of its very 'accidents,' 
the poem reveals itself to be dedicated to nothing other than its own bare 
capacity to take place (accidere): to take place as it is, to take place 
otherwise than it is, and, a limine, not to take place at all -- to be cut short 
and interrupted, like Guillaume's poem, by death" (10).  
"Inventio linguae," Heller-Roazen's first chapter, is devoted to tracing the 
philosophical notion of contingency from Aristotle's De 
Interpretatione through Boethius's Latin rendition and two commentaries on 
it, and the fifth chapter of the De Consolatione Philosophiae. Heller-Roazen 
sees Boethius as radicalizing Aristotle's notion of potentiality and bringing to 
"contingentia" an element that will become central to Heller-Roazen's own 
hypothesis: i.e., the language expressing contingency is "irreducibly 
contingent" itself (21). Abelard's work in the twelth century on future 
contingents, prolonging and modifying Boethius, as well as reflections upon 
it by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, 
constitute the philosophical authorities influencing Jean de Meun. Heller-
Roazen also argues that the invention of vernacular verse from the eleventh 
century onward offers a second powerful example of the "language of 
contingency" (26) or "novel speech" that by its refusal to signify or to refer, 
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breaks with the Classical notion of transparent language to advertise its 
agrammaticality, its unruliness and irregularities. This, then, is the verse 
tradition in which Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun conduct their 
experiments on amorous and poetic contingency.  
Heller-Roazen then moves to consider "The Contingent Subject" in a chapter 
that begins by tracing modern attempts to define subjectivity (Spitzer, 
Singleton, Dragonetti, and Zumthor) and bemoans the insufficiency of the 
most recent attempts to do so. Heller-Roazen proceeds to situate a discussion 
of the medieval subject in the pronouncements of medieval grammarians and 
philosophers, e.g. Donatus, for whom "personam recipere" meant to 
assume/welcome/receive a mask in contradistinction to Zink's notion of 
"incarnating oneself in literature" (33), or Abelard, who sees the first-person 
pronoun as a "shifter . . . belonging to a class of terms that 'determine no 
nature or properties'" (31). The way is thus paved to argue that the "I" of this 
bipartite romance "functions as something other than the sign of a single, 
actual, and existing individual" (34). But the dual authorship is only the most 
obvious part of the complex demonstration, as Heller-Roazen suggests when 
he launches into an analysis of the songe/mençonge (dream/lie) rhetoric 
opening Guillaume's poem, introducing the notion of a fiction whose 
"covered" truth will eventually, when uncovered, be recognized. Guillaume's 
dream, reminiscent of the School of 
Chartres's involucrum and integumentum, is close to the patristic notion of 
"figura" as it functions semiotically and temporally. In the same way that the 
poem "does not simply possess [an already existing] meaning" but rather 
"constitutes it" (40), Guillaume's "je" is double, insisting on the 
differentiation between its present (dreamer's) self and its past self; it is this 
differentiation which constitutes the poem's meaning. The doubled self that 
speaks about itself as protagonist of an histoire (Benveniste) is, according to 
Heller-Roazen, further fractured by the dream fiction "in a temporal 
inversion of the doubling carried out by the narrator's self-recollection" (44). 
Jean de Meun's poetic continuation carries the process even further, "[f]or in 
Jean's text the first-person pronoun will be . . . the cipher of a self who ceases 
to be himself [i.e., Guillaume's already fractured "je"]: a subject . . . who dies 
and survives himself as another, only to be himself, in turn, displaced and 
supplanted by a final figure, for whom the text of the poem has no name" 
(45). This "final figure" with no name is, according to Heller-Roazen, 
the narrataire of the character Amor's revelation of the rupture between 
these two poetic "I's," delivered, strikingly, at the midpoint of the romance. 
Since Amor's intervention is in the future tense prior to the fracture of the 
authorial "I," Heller-Roazen argues that yet another "I" -- the nameless 
addressee of Amor's prophecy -- adds yet another "subject" to the complex 
mix, since "the work has even before its existence, already been foreseen and 
in some sense written" (51). Encapsulating "the simultaneous sameness and 
difference of poetic selves" (53), serving as the locus of identity, identities, 
and non-identity, this first-person pronoun conforms, according to the 
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analysis in Chapter One, to the definition of a contingent subject. 
Furthermore, since it is incommensurate with a specific being and refers to 
the text and the process of love, the "I" becomes a figure for the language of 
the poem, a language that constantly advertises its possibility of being 
otherwise, i.e., its contingency. 
The poetic figure that most interests Heller-Roazen not surprisingly is 
Fortune, whose workings he analyzes in the third chapter. In contrast to the 
dual nature of Fortune in the Classical authors (she brings forth [L. fero] and 
also figures chance and instability) and Boethius, Jean, who himself 
translated the De Consolatione, subtly introduces a significant change by 
seeing fortunam adversam and fortunam prosperam not as two separate and 
opposed currents but as one: "Fortune functions here as a figure for 
contingency [in that she] . . . bestows gifts that are contingentes in the 
technical sense of the medieval philosophers; they are capable, at every 
moment, of revealing themselves . . . as 'their opposite', showing themselves 
. . . to be other than themselves" (76). One of the most impressive, sustained 
sections of the argument focuses on the Aristotelian conception of fortune as 
taking place not "as itself but as something different" (84) and then illustrates 
by persuasive close readings how Jean's Fortune exemplifies the paradox: 
e.g., she never speaks but is spoken of and is thus never unitary; what is at 
issue is not her appearance, Heller-Roazen shows, but rather her construction 
(and, I would add, deconstruction) of that appearance, by covering, then 
uncovering herself, or by contemplating herself as another. As such, Jean's 
Fortune shows what operates in the notion of persona ficta, by laying bare 
the "making of a face" (91).  
Another of Heller-Roazen's important insights in the fourth chapter, 
"Through the Looking-Glass," concerns the lengthy passage (v. 17029 ff.) in 
which Nature reconciles divine foreknowledge with future contingents. 
Earlier commentators have tended to write it off as heavily indebted to 
Boethius, digressive and/or symptomatic of Jean's lack of control of his text. 
Carefully prepared by a review of Aristotle, Boethius and Peter Lombard, 
Heller-Roazen's close reading of Nature's four propositions has the merit of 
focusing on the precise poetic passage that is the crux of the poem's 
meditation on and demonstration of contingency. Nature's reconciliation 
depends upon the "double apprehension" (122) of contingency: i.e., man's 
temporality or mortal perspective on the indeterminate nature of future 
events and God's fully determinate foreknowledge. The image Jean creates to 
figure the difference in perspective is the "mirouer pardurable" (v. 17429), 
"the eternal mirror, which no one, except him [God], can polish, and which 
takes nothing away from free will" (tr. C. Dahlberg, rpt, 1995). What is 
particularly interesting in Jean's use of the mirror is that it is not used, as 
Heller-Roazen shows, in treatises on contingency or in the discussions of 
free will and omniscience in the two centuries preceding the Rose. Heller-
Roazen interprets Jean's mirror as a reversal of Paul's, in that God rather than 
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man looks through the mirror and sees not "in aenigmate" but "apertement" 
(openly, clearly). While this insight is productive, his excursus on God's 
need of a corruptible mirror (since it occasionally needs polishing) to see the 
divine scheme of things, seems to me forced, in a reading that is fortunately 
one of few such: "the mirror introduces a lack into the divine presence 
precisely by filling it" (127). Much more persuasive is the analogy Heller-
Roazen draws between the divine mirror in Jean and the Boethian image 
figuring the relationship of time to eternity as the circle's periphery to its 
center. Thus, Heller-Roazen can show that Nature's mirror is "a 
singular translatio of philosophical conceptuality into poetic figuration" 
(129). The demonstration is further enriched when Heller-Roazen notes the 
morphemic and lexical closeness between specula (f.), (watchtower), which 
to Boethius denotes God's eternal, all-dominating vigilance, and Jean's 
mirror or speculum (m.). The allusiveness of the latter gains thereby to 
suggest divine foreknowledge per speculum not ab specula, although what 
Heller-Roazen calls the "complex lexical and semantic translatio from Latin 
to Old French" (129) seems more properly to me an example of the interplay 
among words and concepts already comfortably installed in the bilingual 
space of thirteenth-century literary production. 
Heller-Roazen's final contribution comes in his concise conclusion when he 
examines the character Faux Semblant as yet another figure of the contingent 
subject. Faux Semblant's protean change into any identity and then its 
opposite -- wrongly interpreted by early critics as yet another of Jean's 
digressions -- has been more richly read, the author believes, by recent critics 
(Stakel, Patterson, Huot, and K. Brownlee) as a polyphonic and multivocal 
figure. Heller-Roazen conceives of his own focus on contingency as building 
on their work by showing that the character is "a figure of the two-part 
romance itself . . . doubled through its unitary bipartition, multiplied by its 
single "I," fractured by the temporal and hermeneutic structures of its 
allegory, set in movement by its figures of instability and impermanence" 
(136).  
Tightly organized, dense, vetted by several of the foremost Rose scholars, 
this rich study is also perforce circumscribed in the breadth of its analysis. 
Heller-Roazen not only recognizes this fact when he states "Fortune's 
Faceslays no claim to comprehensiveness in its readings" (9) but also sees it 
as one of its strengths. Unlike other studies that have sought to elucidate the 
complex architecture of the conjoined poems, he focuses on reading closely 
"a series of forms, figures, and moments of contingency in the romance that 
prove exemplary for an understanding of the work as a whole" (9). The result 
is an elegant book by a scholar from whom we can hope for further equally 
incisive contributions to medieval studies. 
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